Introduction
Ever since the Vietnamese nation-state emerged as an independent entity in the first millennium it has had to contend with "the tyranny of geography." Vietnam shares a common border with China its giant neighbour to the north. Even today, with a population of 88 million, Vietnam ranks as a middle sized Chinese province. As a major study by Brantly Womack notes, the bilateral relationship has been embedded in a structure of persistent asymmetry throughout recorded history. 1 This paper focuses on how Vietnam's leaders manage relations with a rising China. Womack's theory of asymmetry provides a useful framework for analyzing this relationship. Womack argues "disparities in capacities create systemic differences in interests and perspectives between stronger and weaker sides." 2 The larger power always looms more importantly to the weaker than the reverse. This structural factor results in over attention to the bilateral relationship on the part of the weaker state because more is at risk. The result, Womack concludes, is that weaker states are "prone to paranoia." 3 Conversely, the stronger power is less attentive to the details of the bilateral relationship with a weaker state. These contrasting views often lead to misperception.
Womack argues that Sino-Vietnamese hostility over Cambodia in the 1980s (which he terms "hostile asymmetry") led to a stalemate when both sides realized that they could not prevail. This led to a period of negotiated normalization (1990-99) in which both parties came to recognize and accept the interests of the other. Normalcy, according to Womack, does not alter the asymmetric nature of relations; but it ushers in a new phase that he characterizes as normal or mature asymmetry. According to Womack, " [n]ormalcy might be called 'mature asymmetry' because it is grounded in a learning experience and it has the capacity to be long term and stable." 4 In other words, both parties adopt mutual expectations of the other's behaviour. The stronger expects deference, while the weaker expects that its autonomy will be acknowledged.
Mature asymmetric relations are kept peaceful by careful management by both parties. Womack identifies a number of methods to manage bilateral relations. 5 One method is to rely on past precedent to shape common expectations of how the bilateral relationship should proceed. Another method is through "diplomatic ritual" or the exchange of high-level delegations, through which each party reassures the other. For example, Vietnam can be expected to offer assurances to China that its power will be respected and not challenged; in return Vietnam can expect assurance from China that its autonomy will not be violated.
A third method for managing bilateral relations is to remove contentions issues from the political front burner. This can be done by reformulating the issues in dispute in order to stress common interests. For example, territorial disputes can be reformulated as a border control issue designed to promote trade. Or contentious issues can be relegated to the purview of specialist working groups for resolution. Both parties can also buffer their relations through common membership in multilateral associations and adherence to international agreements. The weaker party also has the options of joining other smaller states in a regional organization or allying with a third party. This paper will review the structural dynamics of Sino-Vietnamese relations in the current period of mature asymmetry. It will examine the key bilateral and multilateral mechanisms that assist in managing Sino-Vietnamese relations and the challenges posed by territorial disputes in the South China Sea to the stability of mature asymmetric relations.
Key Bilateral and Multilateral Mechanisms

Bilateral Mechanisms
This section provides an overview of the structure of bilateral relations involving both party-to-party relations as well as state-to-state and military-to-military relations. 6 In March 1999, a summit meeting of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) adopted a sixteen-character guideline calling for "long-term, stable, future-orientated, good-neighborly and allround cooperative relations." In June 2008, following another summit of party leaders in Beijing, bilateral relations were raised to that of strategic partners, and a year later this was upgraded to a strategic cooperative partnership.
Vietnam and China hold regular summit meetings of their party leaders. These meetings provide the opportunity for wide-ranging discussions and an impetus for the resolution of various outstanding issues. Party-to-party relations are cemented by the frequent exchange of party delegations from Central Committee Departments, administrative units, and specialists on socialist ideology. The VCP and CCP have also conducted a series of five seminars on ideology. In sum, party-toparty ties have been used to identify common ground between former antagonists. Vietnam and China initiated their first defence contacts since the 1979 border war in 1992. In April 2005, they initiated their first annual defence security consultations; and in November 2010 they held their first Strategic Defence Security Dialogue in Hanoi. 7 Vietnam pursues three strategies in its relations with China. First, it utilizes highlevel party and state visits as a diplomatic tool to codify its relations with China. Vietnam has negotiated a web of joint statements, agreements, and treaties in an effort to quarantine contentious issues from intruding on and negatively affecting other areas of cooperation and to make Chinese behavior more predictable and less likely to harm Vietnam's national interests.
High-level meetings have resulted in the adoption of guidelines to regulate bilateral relations and set deadlines for lower officials to settle particular disputes -such as the land border. A prime example may be found in Vietnam's approach to managing border disputes with China. 8 Vietnam stresses the legacy of past close relations and mutual benefit over contemporary differences. Vietnam obtained Chinese agreement to detach these issues from high-level consideration and to relegate them to technical working groups, and to solve the easier problems before the more difficult. Vietnam's diplomatic strategy emphasized common interests, such as making the land border safe and secure so that both sides could benefit from cross- Vietnam's third strategy may be characterized as self-help or developing its own sufficient military capacity to deter China from using force. For example, Vietnam will take delivery of six Kilo-class submarines from Russia over a six-year period commencing 2011. This is a defensive strategy aimed at area denial. Vietnam has also offered Cam Ranh Bay as a repair facility to all navies in the world in an effort to encourage the presence of foreign navies in the South China Sea. China exerts direct pressure through high-level meetings by national leaders. Immediately after holding its eleventh national congress, the VCP dispatched a special envoy, Hoang Binh Quan, to Beijing to convey a letter of invitation to President and General Secretary Hu Jintao to visit Vietnam. Hu responded by issuing a reciprocal invitation for Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong to visit China. 9 Party-to-party relations represent a special conduit for Chinese influence. Vietnam's model of economic development borrows heavily but not exclusively from Chinese experience. Vietnamese foreign policy also mimics Chinese formulations such as appropriating the expression "peace, cooperation and development" to describe general strategic trends in Asia Pacific. Hanoi also adapts Chinese ideology to its own needs, such as "the threat of peaceful evolution". In sum, no other foreign state is as assertive or influential in Hanoi than China. 10 China's trade surplus has figured at every high-level summit in recent years. Party and state leaders agree that efforts should be made to make it more balanced. But how? The structure of Vietnamese exports had changed little over the years and no major change is expected in the coming years. Vietnamese domestic manufacturers cannot produce quality goods that are competitive in the Chinese market place. Restricting Chinese imports is not on the cards. Vietnamese leaders have called for increased Chinese investment to mitigate the trade imbalance. Although China has responded, the total amount of investment ($3 billion) is modest when compared to other foreign investors. Bui Hong Phuc, former Ambassador to China, has suggested encouraging Chinese businessmen to set up a production base in Vietnam to lower the amount of imports from China. 11 Also, China's investment in bauxite mining in the Central Highlands has proven to be highly contentious in Vietnam.
Economic Relations
In addition to the economic benefits of trade, there are also geo-strategic considerations at play. The growth of trade has been accompanied by a massive upgrading and construction of infrastructure -roads, bridges, railways -much of it funded by the Asian Development Bank and World Bank as part of the Greater Mekong Sub-region. Increasingly mainland Southeast Asia is being linked to southwestern China. In addition, Vietnam and China are promoting the development of the "two corridors and one economic beltway' linking southern China, Hainan island and northern Vietnam. From Hanoi's point of view, this not only serves Vietnam's development needs, but also enmeshes China and provides Beijing incentives for cooperative behavior.
The relationship between Vietnam and China is a highly asymmetric one in all dimensions of power. Vietnam, with a population of 89 million, ranks as the world's thirteenth most populous country, yet it is only a middle sized Chinese province by comparison. The major strategic preoccupation of the Vietnamese leadership is how to use the levers of diplomacy, economic relations and military ties to maintain their autonomy and independence and prevent from being pulled into China's orbit.
Defence Relations
This section provides an assessment of Vietnam's military relations with China under six sub-headings: high-level exchanges, naval port visits, professional military education and training, other defense cooperation, arms and equipment sales and strategic cooperation.
High-Level Visits
The pattern of ministerial level visits between Vietnam and China has been more erratic and heavily weighted China's favor. Vietnam's defense minister has journeyed to China on seven occasions since 1991. A six-year gap occurred between the second and third visits and a five-year gap took place between the fourth and fifth visits. The exchanges are not reciprocal. China High-level exchanges between Vietnam and China may be classified into three broad categories: general staff, general political department and regional military commands. There is a rough balance in exchanges at general staff and general political department level. 13 China has dispatched three delegations of regional military commanders to Vietnam and received only one return visit. Most recently, in a new development, the Political Commissar of the Vietnam People's Army Navy, Tran Thanh Huyen, visited Beijing. 14 Because Vietnam and China are both communist states and maintain a system of political control over their armed forces, they have a special avenue of defense cooperation. Also, Vietnam and China share a common border and both have put in a major effort to demine and demarcate their common frontier.
Naval Port Visits
In 
Professional Military Education and Training
Vietnamese-Chinese cooperation in the area of professional military education and training is at the nascent stage. The visits by senior officials from their respective General Political Departments invariably include discussions on exchanging experiences in army building on their agenda. In 2008, Vietnam's Deputy Defense Minister held discussions in Beijing on cooperation in personnel training. Both sides also have discussed Vietnamese participation in courses offered by China's National Defense University. 15 
Other Defense Cooperation
Defense cooperation between Vietnam and China has been mainly of a confidence building nature involving demining and demarcating their common land border and joint naval patrols in the Gulf of Tokin.
Arms Sales and National Defense Industry
In 2005, Vietnam and China initiated discussions at ministerial level on cooperation between their respective national defense industries. That year a delegation from China's Commission for Science, Technology and Industry visited Vietnam. It was later reported that NORINCO (China North Industries Corporation), a Chinese stateowned arms manufacturer, agreed to sell ammunition for small arms, artillery and military vehicles to Vietnam. NORINCO was also reported to be discussing coproduction arrangements for heavy machine guns and ammunition with a 
China-Vietnam Interaction in the South China Sea
This section reviews the interaction between China and Vietnam over the issues related to the South China Sea. It focuses on China's repeated seizure of Vietnamese fishing boats and China's imposition of annual unilateral fishing ban.
According to Vietnamese media reports, China detained or seized thirty-three Vietnamese fishing boats and 433 crewmembers in 2009. 17 Among this number were several Vietnamese fishing boats that were seized by China when they sought shelter in the Paracel Islands during storms in August and October 2009. 18 During 2010, China continued its harassment and detention of Vietnamese fishing boats, particularly in waters near the Paracels. During the first quarter of the year, there were 30 cases when Chinese authorities seized Vietnamese fishing craft and detained more than 200 fishermen. 19 Four of these cases involved 107 Vietnamese fishermen from Quang Ngai province who were held in detention for two months. 20 The following list provides snapshots of six incidents that provide insights into Chinese actions. its crew of nine in waters near the Paracels. 26 Four days later, China officially notified Vietnam that the boat had been seized for violating China's territorial waters and the crew detained.
The above list is not exhaustive. For example, it was reported that Chinese authorities seized 31 Vietnamese fishing boats between mid-and late June. 27 Another report in early October reported that "in recent months China has seized hundreds of Vietnamese fishing boats" in waters around the Paracel and Spratly islands. 28 Vietnamese figures are often contradictory and details of Chinese seizures are not provided on a systematic basis.
Vietnamese Responses
A serious incident developed in the Spratly Islands in March 2010 when Chinese fishing trawlers reported that they were being harassed by Vietnamese fishing boats and called for assistance. China dispatched two Fishery Administration vessels from Hainan. On arrival, they were surrounded by Vietnamese fishing craft. China then ordered PLAN warships from the East Sea Fleet taking part in exercises (discussed above) to rescue the stranded fishery vessels. By the time the warships arrived, all the Vietnamese fishing boats had departed. The PLAN ships then anchored off Fiery Cross Reef before proceeding further south to conduct exercises to the east of the Malacca Strait.
While the above incident was unfolding, Vietnam responded with renewed determination to assert its sovereignty. On 1 April 2010, President Nguyen Minh Triet sailed to Bach Long Vi Island in the Gulf of Tonkin accompanied by two naval escorts. Wide publicity was given in the Vietnamese media to President Triet's declaration that Vietnam would "not let anyone infringe on our territory, our sea, and islands". 29 On 21 September, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry officially lodged a protest with the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi and demanded the immediate and unconditional release of the trawler and its crew. 30 China then announced that the crew had been fishing with explosives and demanded payment of a fine of U.S. $10,500. Vietnam rejected the Chinese allegation pointing out that the boat had been inspected before putting to sea and the Chinese note delivered to the Vietnamese Embassy on 15 September did not mention the issue of explosives. 31 On the eve of the inaugural ADMM Plus Meeting (12 October), Vietnam's Defence Minister Phung Quang Thanh announced that China would unconditionally release the nine detained Vietnamese fishermen. 32 Minister Thanh's remarks were quoted in the local press. However his remarks were abruptly pulled off the internet when the Foreign Ministry revealed that China has requested withholding the announcement of the fishermen's release until after the ADMM Plus Eight had concluded. 33 28 On April 2010, China freed the twenty-three Vietnamese fishermen detained on 25 March and 13 April, after confiscating one of the boats and property valued at U.S. $26,370. 34 
China's Unilateral Fishing Ban
On 1st April 2010 China announced it was dispatching two Fishery Administration ships to patrol disputed areas in the South China Sea prior to its announcement of its annual moratorium on fishing. 35 This action provoked another Vietnamese protest. 36 
Outstanding Issues
Conflicting claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea have led to a number of issues that have soured bilateral relations. 46 Six clusters of issues may be identified: 
China-ASEAN Working Group to Implement the DOC
This section reviews current developments related to the implementation of the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. The DOC was signed by China and ASEAN members in November 2002 after seven years of negotiations. The DOC was to be a guideline for inter-state behaviour until final agreement could be reached on a more formal code of conduct.
Under the terms of the DOC, the signatories agreed to build trust and confidence, respect freedom of navigation and over flight, resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, and exercise self-restraint "in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes" and refrain from occupying uninhabited features. Until territorial and jurisdictional disputes were settled, the DOC urged signatories to build trust and confidence in four areas: dialogue between defence and military officials, humane treatment of persons in distress, voluntary notification of joint/combined exercises, and voluntary exchange of "relevant information". Finally, the DOC suggested that signatories "may explore" cooperation in select areas: marine environment protection; marine scientific research; safety of navigation and communication at sea; search and rescue; and combating transnational crime (trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at sea and illegal traffic in arms). Neither the spirit nor the letter of the DOC has been implemented despite ASEAN representations to China.
During the first half of 2010, South China Sea issues were relegated to the ASEANChina Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which first met in Manila in 2005. Up to this point the Working Group has been totally ineffective in addressing issues arising from the DOC and incidents in the South China Sea. For example, on 16 April 2010 the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group met in Hanoi for two days to discuss "concrete measures for coordination and effective realization" of the DOC. 47 Although one press account reported that the meeting discussed "new ways to promote the effectiveness" of the DOC, no progress was announced. 48 In April 2010, a Vietnamese government spokesperson stated that Vietnam hoped the ASEAN Summit scheduled for October would endorse a code of conduct in the South China Sea to be signed by China in the future (it did not). 49 In July, ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan revealed that negotiations on a regional code of conduct were still under discussion and ministers hoped that the code could be concluded by the end of the year (it was not). 50 This code of conduct would build on the DOC. Three months later, when specifically asked what his expectations were about early agreement to promote technical discussions on a code of conduct, Secretary General Surin replied, "I hope that we can promote discussions, exchanges and I believe that ASEAN and China would prove to the international community that we can achieve that code and we can deal with differences. And it would be the constructive and peaceful code of conduct". 51 Surin then remarked that ASEAN hoped to achieve a breakthrough in 2012, the tenth anniversary of the DOC. 52 Writing in September 2010, Barry Wain noted that "Beijing's failure to give a public reason for refusing to go ahead with the DOC's implementation provisions has frustrated Asean" and, according to an insider, the DOC was on "life support". 53 Wain concluded that a fourth formal meeting of the joint ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the 2002 DOC, scheduled for Beijing later in the year, was likely to be postponed as China had lost interest in proceeding with six agreed projects to implement the DOC.
Nevertheless, the following month by the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines and U.S. Secretary of State offered upbeat assessments. In early October, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Liu Jianchao, revealed that a draft code of conduct was being discussed with ASEAN members at the working level. According to Ambassador Liu, "They have worked on some of the outlines of the document and I think that consultations are still going on". 54 He further remarked that sanctions in the draft against claimant states that violate the code "is under the process of consultations" but no deadline had been set. We reaffirmed our commitment to fully and effectively implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and work towards the eventual adoption, on the basis of consensus, of a code of conduct in the South China Sea, to further contribute to peace, stability and cooperation in the region. We welcomed the progress made in this regard, including the convening of the 4 th Meeting of the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the DOC, and stressed the importance of close consultation and coordination between the ASEAN Member States and China in the implementation of the DOC, including the re-convening of the ASEAN-China SOM on the DOC. 57 During 2010 there were no public bilateral meetings between China and Vietnam on South China Sea issues. Discussions held in 2009 appeared to be in abeyance, such as talks focused on waters at the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin. In December, however, it was revealed that China and Vietnam had conducted four rounds of secret bilateral discussions on South China Sea issues with a fifth round scheduled before the end of the year. 58 At the onset China refused to discuss the Paracels. According to Vietnamese Foreign Ministry sources long-term progress in some areas was possible as the two sides worked on "fundamental guiding principles" to discuss their maritime disputes. 
